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No Action Without Talk? 
UN Peacekeeping, Discourse, and Institutional Self-Legitimation 
Abstract 
In this article, I argue that much of the discourse observable within the UN constitutes neither 
unnecessary and unproductive ‘talk’ nor efforts to convince outside audiences of its legitimacy, 
but actually a form of institutional self-legitimation that is key to its ability to function. Using 
the case of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), I show that because the 
organization has a multifaceted organizational identity, it faces situations where it is forced to 
choose between multiple but equally appropriate courses of action, and it uses self-legitimation 
alongside other mechanisms to overcome these tensions. I specify three sets of circumstances 
in which this occurs, showing how DPKO uses discourse that simplifies and exceptionalizes in 
a bid to reconcile or downplay these contradictions and reassert a cohesive and legitimate 
organizational identity internally. This simplification and exceptionalization in turn serve an 
enabling function, allowing DPKO to continue operating in conditions of complexity by 
decreasing risk aversion and instilling a deep sense of professional loyalty in staff. At the same 
time, such discursive processes are costly and may entrench inefficient practices, rendering the 
effects of self-legitimizing discourse paradoxical: they may enable action, but they reduce the 
efficiency and effectiveness of that action.  
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Introduction 
The UN is frequently derided for being an unwieldy and ineffective bureaucracy. Some 
of this criticism relates to the tendency of member states to engage in lengthy negotiations and 
debates, but some also derives from what appear to be laborious internal discussions and 
seemingly unproductive discursive activities within the Secretariat. By spending so much time 
talking—indeed talking to itself—the UN spends less time doing, and thus fails to deliver on 
its stated objectives or to do so quickly and cost-effectively.  
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In this article, I argue that such assessments suffer from two shortcomings. First, they 
neglect the possibility that this internal ‘talk’ in the UN serves a specific and crucial function 
within the organization, namely a legitimizing function. Indeed, numerous studies show how 
institutions of global governance use discourse to generate legitimacy for themselves and their 
actions by communicating and projecting their relevance, effectiveness, and appropriateness.1 
Second, these assessments fail to take into account the fact that at least some of the discourse 
in these organizations is internally rather than externally directed. The scholarship that has 
examined discourse as a legitimation tool in global governance has focused on the views of 
external constituencies, such as member states, donors, or beneficiaries. This, however, leaves 
out the views of the staff of these organizations themselves, suggesting that they either feel no 
need to view themselves as legitimate or, if they do, never question their own legitimacy.  
In this article, I argue that much of the discourse observable within the UN constitutes 
not unnecessary and unproductive ‘bureaucratic chatter,’ but actually a form of institutional 
self-legitimation that is key to its ability to function. More specifically, because the UN has a 
multifaceted and fragmented organizational identity, it frequently faces situations where it is 
forced to choose between two or more equally valid courses of action.2 Where this is the case, 
the UN may rely on hierarchy, where senior officials dictate which courses of action are 
followed (often at the behest of member states); self-interest, where staff seeking to maximize 
personal advancement or departmental visibility lobby for particular actions; or self-
legitimation, where staff use discourse to reconcile, overcome, or downplay these 
 
1 See Jens Steffek, ‘The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach’, 
European Journal of International Relations, 9:2 (June 2003), pp. 249-275; Jennifer Gronau 
and Henning Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy in world politics – international 
institutions’ legitimation strategies’, Review of International Studies, 42 (2016), pp. 535-557; 
Dominik Zaum (ed), Legitimating International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
2 Sarah von Billerbeck, ‘UN Peace Operations and Conflicting Legitimacies’, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding, 11:3 (2017), pp. 286-305. 
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contradictions by portraying them, at least rhetorically, as appropriate. While it is likely that a 
combination of these mechanisms will be at work where trade-offs and dilemmas exist, this 
paper focuses on the third of these.  
More specifically, using a case study of the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations,3 I demonstrate how the UN uses discourse that simplifies and exceptionalizes in 
order to portray itself and its behavior as non-contradictory, coherent, appropriate, and good. 
Importantly, this discourse is directed inwards, not at external audiences, but at UN staff 
themselves, who need to feel reassured that they are behaving appropriately for their 
organizational identity when compelled to choose between conflicting obligations.  
This discourse in turn serves an enabling function, allowing UN staff to continue 
operating in conditions of complexity by, first, decreasing risk aversion and, second, instilling 
a deep sense of professional loyalty in them. In this regard, self-legitimizing discourse helps to 
create a unified organizational narrative in the face of trade-offs and dilemmas, without which 
staff would find it difficult to act at all. In short, the UN should not be characterized as ‘all talk 
and no action,’ but rather ‘no action without talk.’ At the same time, the effects of self-
legitimizing discourse are not entirely positive. Discursive practices are time-consuming and 
costly and can lead to inaccurate or insufficient self-assessment, and thus may impede the 
efficiency and effectiveness of any action that they enable. In this sense, self-legitimation is 
paradoxical: it may be crucial to the work of the UN, but it also renders that work less efficient.  
I proceed as follows. The first part of the article is theoretical. First, I introduce the 
concept of self-legitimation, situating it within scholarship on legitimacy and legitimation from 
international relations, organization studies, and sociology. Second, I apply it to UN peace 
operations, explaining how this flagship activity of the UN showcases the UN’s multiple 
organizational identities and the resulting dilemmas and trade-offs faced by staff. Third, I 
 
3 DPKO was renamed the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) in January 2019. 
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discuss how self-legitimizing discourse is one of the ways that staff deal with such complexity: 
through the creation of narratives that simplify and exceptionalize, they portray their actions as 
appropriate and irreproachable. My focus is on the individual self-identifications of DPKO 
staff; however, because these are professional identities, are the product of social interactions 
with other staff in the context of DPKO, and are widely shared among most staff, they can be 
viewed as a collective identity that is representative of an overall organizational identity.4 
The second part of the article is empirical and presents findings and analysis from in-
depth qualitative interviews of DPKO staff. First, after outlining the methods used for this 
study, I distinguish three sets of circumstances in which DPKO self-legitimizes. Second, I 
explore the content of the UN’s legitimizing discourse, identifying four themes that serve to 
simplify conflicting obligations and to exceptionalize DPKO staff, portraying them as unique 
and morally superior. Finally, I examine the repercussions of this discourse, including both 
how it enables action but also reduces efficiency, rendering the effects staff members’ 
discourse paradoxical. The final section concludes, offering reflections on how self-
legitimation functions in the UN more broadly and in other international organizations.  
 
Legitimacy, Legitimation, and Discourse 
Most definitions of legitimacy focus on the possession and use of power in the 
relationship between rulers and ruled. Where powerful actors wield their authority in 
accordance with a set of shared, socially embedded norms and values, they are considered 
legitimate by those subject to it, and the latter are more likely to comply with authority 
voluntarily, rather than being forced to through coercion or tempted to through inducements.5 
Legitimacy, in this way, is considered to enhance the effectiveness of those in power because 
 
4 Note that for simplicity, I sometimes refer to the collective staff of DPKO simply as 
‘DPKO.’ 
5 Steffek, ‘Legitimation of International Governance’, p. 254. 
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obedience and acquiescence are more certain and less costly. As Claude has pointed out, 
‘[l]egitimacy…makes all rulers more effective—more secure in the possession of power and 
more successful in its exercise.’6 
This is particularly true in the case of international organizations like the UN, which 
usually do not possess the means to elicit compliance through coercion or inducements.7 
Indeed, Suchman describes legitimacy as ‘an operational resource that organizations…employ 
in pursuit of their goals.’8 The link between legitimacy and effectiveness has been a particular 
focus of studies of peacekeeping.9 If an operation is deemed legitimate—that is, if its actions 
and objectives are considered appropriate according to shared norms and principles—host 
country populations that are subject to the operation will comply with it, donors that fund it 
will continue to provide resources, and states that authorize it will renew its mandate.  
For this reason, peace operations, as well as international organizations more generally, 
make particular efforts to cultivate legitimacy for themselves—that is, to engage in 
legitimation. In contrast to legitimacy, which can be conceived of as perceived compliance 
with norms and values present in the organizational environment, legitimation entails a set of 
practices aimed at asserting and demonstrating that compliance; in short, legitimacy is the goal, 
legitimation is the way to get there.  
These legitimation efforts tend to be discursive in nature. As Steffek argues, 
legitimation usually occurs through ‘public discourse’ and a ‘communicative process’ through 
which the party seeking legitimacy ‘“giv[es] reasons”’ for why those subject to it should 
 
6 Inis L. Claude, Jr. ‘Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the United Nations’, 
International Organization, 20:3 (1966), pp. 367-79 (p. 368). 
7 Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
8 Mark C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, 
Academy of Management Review, 20:3 (1995), pp. 571-610 (p. 576), emphasis in original. 
9 See, for example, Jeni Whalan, How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, and 
Effectiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Thomas Risse, ‘No Success Without 
Legitimacy! A Comment on Military Intervention’, Global Policy (18 June 2014). 
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comply.10 It involves demonstrating alignment with the rules and principles of a particular 
social setting and demonstrating the appropriateness of one’s role and behavior in that setting. 
Berger and Luckman also describe legitimation as a process of ‘explanation,’11 and Van 
Leeuwen asserts that ‘[l]anguage is without doubt the most important vehicle for [legitimation] 
attempts.’12 In short, through language and other media, actors are able to delineate the social 
environment, specify the identity and role of actors within it, and make claims about how their 
behavior is rational, appropriate, and legitimate in that environment.13  
 
Self-Legitimacy and Self-Legitimation 
These definitions are only partly useful in thinking about self-legitimation. Because 
they focus on external perceptions of legitimacy and externally-directed legitimation practices, 
they fail to acknowledge that without an internal sense of legitimacy, organizations like the UN 
may find it difficult to act at all because they would lack a clear sense that they are the 
appropriate actor to take on particular tasks and a sense that their actions are cohesive and 
appropriate. This would, indeed, make it difficult or even impossible to make such claims to 
outside audiences. In this way, self-legitimation differs from ‘traditional’ definitions of 
legitimation in that the binary relationship between actors is no longer relevant. Instead, self-
legitimacy is concerned with an actor’s own perceptions of its appropriateness, and self-
 
10 Jens Steffek, ‘Discursive Legitimation in Environmental Governance’, Forest Policy and 
Economics, 11 (2009), pp. 313-318 (p. 315). 
11 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Penguin, 1966), p. 112. 
12 Theo Van Leeuwen, ‘Legitimation in discourse and communication’, Discourse and 
Communication, 1:1 (2007), pp. 91-112 (p. 91). See also Rodney Barker, Legitimating 
Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rules and Subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), and Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations (Marshall, MA: Pitman, 1981). 
13 Though beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on language and narratives, 
discursive activities can also extend to visual, material, and performative acts, including 
symbols, rituals, and events. See Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy’, p. 586, and Barker, 
Legitimating Identities, p. 41, 51. 
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legitimation thus entails an endogenous process that focuses on the (re)construction and 
(re)affirmation of an identity that can be considered appropriate and aligned with norms and 
values present in a particular setting.14 In short, self-legitimation is a process by which actors 
reassure themselves that they are legitimate and that they are acting in ways appropriate to their 
identity in a given social or organizational environment. 
Notably, actors’ concern with internal legitimacy and their efforts to reaffirm, for 
themselves, a cohesive and appropriate sense of identity has received relatively little dedicated 
study, despite the fact that scholars from a variety of fields, including international relations, 
sociology, and organizational studies, have remarked upon the importance of self-perceptions 
of legitimacy and a clear sense of institutional identity for organizations to be able to effectively 
fulfill their mandates. Meyer and Rowan note that organizations that comply with ‘collectively 
valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner’ are able to ‘increase their legitimacy’ and 
thus be more successful.15 Similarly, Alvesson and Willmott assert that a cohesive 
organizational identity that staff consider ‘appropriate, desirable and valued’ can produce ‘a 
degree of existential continuity and security’ for them, while its absence can generate ‘tensions 
and the possibility of breakdown,’ thus leading to ineffectiveness.16 Oelsner, similarly, stresses 
that a strong and cohesive sense of identity is indispensable for organizational effectiveness,17 
and Barker, likewise, argues that, in addition to its external forms, ‘legitimation is an activity 
 
14 Ben Bradford and Paul Quinton, ‘Self-Legitimacy, Police Culture and Support for 
Democratic Policing in an English Constabulary’, British Journal of Criminology 54 (2014), 
pp. 1023-1046 (p. 1027); Barker, Legitimating Identities, p. 112. 
15 John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as 
Myth and Ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, 83:2 (1977), pp. 340-363 (p. 349, 
340). 
16 Mats Alvesson and Hugh Willmott, ‘Identity Regulation as Organizational Control: 
Producing the Appropriate Individual’, Journal of Management Studies 39:5 (2002), pp. 620-
644 (pp. 625-626). 
17 Andrea Oelsner, ‘The Institutional Identity of Regional Organizations, Or Mercosur’s 
Identity Crisis’, International Studies Quarterly, 57 (2013), pp. 115-127 (p. 117). 
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which serves to confirm the identity of the legitimator.’18 All of these comments point to a 
utilitarian view of self-legitimation in organizations: not only does it provide a kind of 
psychological or ontological security for organizations, but it is also perceived to render them 
more effective.19  
This process is particularly important in organizations that have fragmented or 
contradictory identities. As von Billerbeck argues, for organizations with multiple identities 
that each have their own set of normatively appropriate behaviors and normatively acceptable 
goals, it becomes difficult to construct and reaffirm a cohesive sense of institutional legitimacy 
because in reaffirming one identity, they may contradict another.20 In other words, 
organizations with multifaceted identities may sometimes face conflicting or mutually 
exclusive ‘appropriatenesses,’ and therefore will be forced to ‘violate’ what is appropriate to 
one side of its identity in order to comply with what is appropriate to another. This in turn may 
counteract any gains in terms of effectiveness described above, because the organization will 
lack coherence and clear purposes. As a result, it is precisely such organizations that have the 
greatest need to engage in self-legitimation, as their legitimacy will be less secure than an 
organization with a single, clear identity and sense of mission.  
Few organizations capture this level of fragmentation more than the UN’s Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). I highlight two sources of fragmentation. First, the UN 
 
18 Barker, Legitimating Identities, p. 112. 
19 The idea of ontological security was first developed by psychologists who asserted that 
individuals require a stable sense of self. This idea was subsequently adopted into 
organizational studies and international relations, which hold that organizations and states 
also require cohesive identities. See Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and 
Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); Filip Ejdus, 
‘Critical Situations, Fundamental Questions and Ontological Insecurity in World Politics’, 
Journal of International Relations and Development (2017); and Jennifer Mitzen, 
‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, European 
Journal of International Relations 12:3 (2006), pp. 341-370. 
20 Sarah von Billerbeck, ‘“Mirror, Mirror, On the Wall”: Self-Legitimation by International 
Organizations’, International Studies Quarterly (2019), online first. 
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fills both normative and operational functions in its peacekeeping operations.21 On the one 
hand, it is the global leader in setting standards for appropriate behavior in the international 
system relating to governance, human rights, and justice in conflict and post-conflict situations. 
On the other hand, it operates 13 peacekeeping operations with nearly 100,000 personnel and 
engages in combat, humanitarian relief, institutional reform, and capacity building.22 These 
different normative and operational identities can entail mutually exclusive obligations and 
dictate appropriate behaviors that conflict with one another. For example, normative 
imperatives related to inclusive processes, consensus requirements, and transparency and 
operational imperatives related to the timely and cost-effective delivery of results often clash 
in practice. Similarly, the inclusion of spoilers or those with records of human rights violations 
in peace processes may be critical to securing and sustaining peace but may also be detrimental 
to the cause of justice and to the UN’s own dedication to the promotion of human rights.23 
Second, DPKO is simultaneously an instrument of UN member states tasked with 
implementing Security Council peacekeeping mandates and an independent body of experts, 
who have specialized knowledge, skills, and often lengthy experience relating to the design 
and implementation of peacekeeping.24 DPKO staff understand and accept that, according to 
the Charter, their role entails the execution of decisions by the Security Council and other 
member states, but because they self-identify as experts in peacekeeping, they also want to 
demonstrate their expertise, utilize their experience, and follow courses of action they deem 
 
21 von Billerbeck, ‘Mirror, Mirror’. 
22 United Nations Peacekeeping, ‘Global peacekeeping data (as of 31 January 2020)’, 
available at: {https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data}, accessed 19 February 2020. 
23 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, ‘Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of 
Postwar Statebuilding’, Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding, International Peace 
Academy (November 2007); Stephen Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, 
International Security 22:2 (1997), pp. 5-53; see also Whalan, Peace Operations, pp. 31-32.  
24 von Billerbeck, ‘Mirror, Mirror’; Inis L. Claude, ‘Peace and Security: Prospective Roles 
for the Two United Nations’, Global Governance, 2:3 (1996), pp. 289-298. 
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appropriate based upon their own analysis.25 However, what staff think is most appropriate and 
what member states consider the best course of action may not align, thus again creating 
situations where DPKO staff face contradictory, if equally valid, obligations.  
As these two divisions show, DPKO staff face an incoherent and contradictory 
institutional identity, and these different facets of its identity can prescribe conflicting 
objectives and can entail conflicting sets of appropriate behavior. These conflicts, in turn, make 
it harder for DPKO staff to maintain a sense of their own legitimacy: if behavior appropriate 
to one side of their identity contradicts behavior appropriate to another, staff are unlikely to 
view themselves as legitimate and their work as right or valid.26 As noted above, this can 
engender tension or breakdown in organizational settings and can reduce effectiveness. 
Accordingly, DPKO staff engage in self-legitimation in a bid to reconcile such contradictions, 
reassert a cohesive institutional identity, show their alignment with shared norms and values, 
and thus demonstrate their appropriateness and legitimacy. 
 
The Discourse of Self-Legitimation: Simplification and Exceptionalization 
Efforts to generate such self-perceptions of legitimacy, like with external legitimation, 
come largely through discourse. As mentioned, discourse uses language and communication to 
construct and frame the social world, to specify the identity and role of particular actors within 
it, and to define appropriate, acceptable, and rational behavior.27 In the case of UN 
 
25 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. (New York: United Nations, 1945), 
Chapter XV; Susan Hannah Allen and Amy T. Yuen, ‘The Politics of Peacekeeping: UN 
Security Council Oversight Across Peacekeeping Missions’, International Studies Quarterly 
58 (2014), pp. 621-632 (p. 623); and Joel Gwyn Winckler, ‘Exceeding Limitations of the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Bureaucracy: Strategies of Officials to Influence Peacekeeping 
Activities within the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations’, International Peacekeeping 22:1 (2015), pp. 43-64 (p. 43). 
26 von Billerbeck, ‘Mirror, Mirror’. 
2727 Séverine Autesserre, ‘Dangerous tales: Dominant narratives on the Congo and their 
unintended consequences’, African Affairs, 111:443 (2012), pp. 202-222; Bentley B. Allan, 
Scientific Cosmology and International Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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peacekeeping, some of these discursive practices may of course be externally visible, but they 
are also aimed at an internal audience, sometimes exclusively, in a bid to reassure staff that 
they are acting in accordance with particular socially embedded norms and values that are 
appropriate to their organizational identity.28 This self-legitimizing discourse achieves these 
aims through simplification and exceptionalization. Both of these enable DPKO staff to 
construct a version of reality in which the contradictions they face are minimized or ignored 
and their actions are necessarily good, and one in which their role is distinct and clearly defined, 
thus reasserting a cohesive institutional identity and unambiguous legitimacy.29  
First, as noted, internal perceptions of legitimacy are particularly hard to generate and 
maintain in organizations that face contradictory or mutually exclusive obligations and tasks. 
Discourse that simplifies, ‘papers over,’ or ignores such contradictions can therefore help staff 
to maintain a cohesive sense of mission, purpose, and appropriateness and, by extension, to 
continue operating in conditions of complexity. Indeed, self-legitimizing discourse should not 
aim to capture or explain complexity, but instead should provide an account of the multiple 
and conflicting tasks faced by staff that portrays them either as reconciled, co-existing, or 
 
2018), pp. 40-41; and Peter Kjær and Ove K. Pedersen, ‘Translating Liberalization: 
Neoliberalism in the Danish Negotiated Economy’, in John L. Campbell and Ove K. 
Pedersen (eds), The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2001). 
28 As mentioned above, it is important to note here that while I refer to organizational 
identity, I focus empirically on the individual self-identity and individual and group 
discursive practices of staff members. Because these are professional identities and practices 
(as opposed to private or personal ones) that exist within the context of DPKO, are the 
product of interactions between staff in the workplace, and are shared by most staff, they 
jointly constitute a shared organizational identity.  
29 I do not use the term ‘exception’ in the sense of that most theories of exception in 
international relations do. The latter do not address legitimacy or international organizations, 
but are taken up in the context of the state and securitization, where states have the authority 
to decide upon exceptions to rules and laws. However, these theories do point out that 
exceptions are constitutive of social orders and political communities, similar to the sense in 
which I use the term here. See, for example, Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, 
‘Exceptionalism and the “War on Terror”: Criminology Meets International Relations’, The 
British Journal of Criminology, 49:5 (2009), pp. 686-701.  
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nonexistent, thus doing away with factors that are confusing or contradictory. Autesserre 
describes the ‘power’ of simplified narratives in conflict settings,30 and van Leeuwen likewise 
asserts that peacebuilding actors ‘need to simplify reality to be able to operate and deal with 
the complexity of conflict and peacebuilding.’31 Allan notes that discourses usually ‘present 
only a small portion of reality,’32 and Law similarly argues that organizations use various 
discourses—which he refers to as ‘modes of ordering’—to simplify and thus cope with 
complexity.33 
While these references mostly refer to external complexity—that is, a characteristic of 
the operational context in which peacekeeping occurs—it applies equally to complexity that 
derives from within an organization—in this case from the multiple and conflicting operational, 
normative, and institutional obligations entailed by the different sides of DPKO’s identity. 
Simplifying discourse in this regard enables staff to view their identity as cohesive and unitary 
rather than fragmented and incoherent, and thus to maintain a sense of their own legitimacy in 
the face difficult choices. 
Second, discourse that portrays staff as exceptional, unique, and superior also helps to 
boost identity cohesion and overcome or diminish contradictions and hard choices. 
Exceptionalizing discourse suggests that legitimacy comes from being unique and morally 
superior and thus ‘above’ operational trade-offs. Wry, Lounsbury, and Glynn contend that 
‘legitimacy is more likely to be achieved when [organization] members articulate a clear 
defining collective identity story that identifies the group’s orienting purpose and core 
 
30 Autesserre, ‘Dangerous tales’. 
31 Mathijs van Leeuwen, Partners in Peace: Discourses and Practices of Civil-Society 
Peacebuilding (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 7. 
32 Allan, Scientific Cosmology, p. 42. 
33 John Law, Organising Modernity: Social Ordering and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994). 
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practices.’34 Barker concurs, arguing that internal perceptions of legitimacy relate strongly to 
feeling that one is ‘special, marked by particular qualities, [and] set apart from other people.’35 
Discourse that portrays DPKO staff in these terms, then, helps them to remain reassured of 
their legitimacy: even where they are forced to take actions that may contradict one side of 
their identity, their overall moral superiority and appropriateness remain unchanged. 
In the next sections I explore the discourse of self-legitimation empirically in DPKO. 
After specifying my methodological approach and case selection, I first outline three sets of 
circumstances in which staff in DPKO self-legitimize. Second, I explore the content of self-
legitimacy in DPKO, highlighting four themes that run through their discourse and that 
simplify or eliminate the trade-offs they face and that exceptionalize DPKO staff and portray 
them as above and unaffected by those trade-offs. Finally, I describe how this discourse fills 
both an enabling function, allowing DPKO staff to function in spite of the trade-offs they face, 
but how it simultaneously reduces effectiveness and efficiency, thus reversing some of the 
positive effects of self-legitimation.  
 
Methods and Case Selection 
In studying legitimacy empirically, scholars are divided over whether it should be 
viewed as a prescriptive or descriptive phenomenon.36 According to prescriptive conceptions, 
legitimacy exists when an authority meets certain external, objective standards. According to 
descriptive conceptions, it exists when those subject to that authority perceive it to exist. In this 
 
34 Tyler Wry, Michael Lounsbury, and Mary Ann Glynn. ‘Legitimating Nascent Collective 
Identities: Coordinating Cultural Entrepreneurship’, Organization Science 22:2 (2011), pp. 
449-463 (p. 449), emphasis in original. 
35 Barker, Legitimating Identities, p. 35. 
36 See Steffek, ‘Legitimation of International Governance’, p. 253. These different types are 
sometimes referred to as objective and subjective or normative and empirical. See Sarah von 
Billerbeck and Birte Julia Gippert, ‘Introducing Legitimacy in Conflict: Concepts, Practices, 
Challenges’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 11:3 (2017), pp. 286-305, and Gronau 
and Schmidtke, ‘The quest for legitimacy’. 
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article, I adopt the latter conception since I am concerned with DPKO’s perceptions of its own 
legitimacy. Such perceptions are, of course, difficult to measure, and measurement relies 
heavily on the subjective, expressed views of staff within DPKO. Accordingly, my analysis is 
based upon in-depth interviews in order to empirically study how UN staff create and assess 
their own legitimacy.  
My focus is, as mentioned, on DPKO. There are several reasons for this choice. First, 
the UN is a vast and variegated organization, and a study of self-legitimation in the entire 
organization would be unfeasible. Second and more importantly, DPKO has a highly 
fragmented organizational identity, as mentioned above, and thus it regularly faces conflicting 
obligations and objectives. As described, DPKO is both a normative and an operational actor; 
it is also both a body of skilled practitioners with its own preferences and outlooks and a degree 
of autonomy, as well as an instrument established, tasked, and funded by member states that is 
obliged to do as they instruct. While in this sense, DPKO constitutes a hard case,37 it also means 
that there will be multiple instances where self-legitimizing discourse can be observed since 
self-legitimation is more likely to occur in organizations with multiple and conflicting 
identities. The examination of a hard case, of course, reduces generalizability, but is useful in 
identifying the strongest means through which and widest range of conditions under which 
self-legitimation occurs.38 Finally, DPKO is a part of the UN that is accessible to researchers, 
and thus practices of self-legitimation are both visually observable and ascertainable through 
interviews. 
I undertook four rounds of fieldwork in New York, Geneva, and Berlin, conducting 37 
in-depth semi-structured interviews with current and former staff of DPKO and other divisions 
 
37 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, ‘Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A 
Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options’, Political Research Quarterly, 61:2 (2008), 
pp. 294-308. 
38 I take up the application of my findings to other organizations, including both other parts of 
the UN and other international organizations, in the conclusion. 
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of the UN that collaborate operationally with DPKO. These were conducted between January 
2017 and February 2018. I used a purposeful sampling technique to recruit interviewees, 
seeking a range of levels of seniority, function, and duration of tenure in DPKO in order to 
ensure that the views expressed were broadly representative of the population of DPKO as a 
whole. All interviewees were civilian Secretariat staff, not national representatives seconded 
to the UN; most have held posts both in headquarters and in peacekeeping missions in the field. 
I used the concept of saturation in drawing conclusions. Data saturation in qualitative 
research is reached when a study can be replicated, when no new themes can be identified, and 
when further data collection and coding are not feasible.39 When this point is reached will vary 
by project; however, in this case, the emergence of patterns and common themes was apparent 
from early on, and there was remarkably little variation between interviewees. My purposeful 
recruitment of a diverse group of interviewees within DPKO provided protection against biased 
data by ensuring that I did not only record the views of individuals with similar profiles who 
might therefore share the same perspective.40 
 
Self-Legitimation in UN Peacekeeping: Three Sets of Circumstances 
As described, DPKO faces a multifaceted and contradictory institutional identity that 
confronts staff with trade-offs, dilemmas, and difficult choices about how to behave 
appropriately. This raises doubts for staff about their own legitimacy and the legitimacy of their 
work, and accordingly they use self-legitimizing discourse in order to assuage these doubts. 
There are three sets of circumstances in which this occurs: where normative and operational 
 
39 Patricia I. Fusch and Lawrence R. Ness, ‘Are We There Yet? Data Saturation in Qualitative 
Research’, The Qualitative Report, 20:9 (2015), pp.1408-16 (p. 1409). 
40 H. Russell Bernard, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 
2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012). 
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imperatives clash, where the peacekeeping agenda is aligned only with narrow member state 
interests, and where results are weak or peacekeeping is beset by scandals.41  
 First, staff described a variety of situations in peacekeeping in which their normative 
and operational responsibilities conflict, forcing them to ‘choose between’ different 
obligations. For example, one senior peacekeeping official noted that missions are often 
confronted both with host states that insist that the UN respect their sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and with minority groups that insist upon their right to self-determination, calling this 
‘the big dilemma’ for peacekeeping personnel.42 Similarly, in interacting with host country 
populations and governments, staff grapple with dual imperatives towards local ownership and 
support for the host government and towards efficiently delivering outcomes.43 One noted that 
‘on one hand, you want to get things done. People need services, especially for countries 
emerging from horrific civil war and where everything’s been destroyed…But, at the same 
time, very quickly the disenchantment [with the UN] sets in,’ and if the UN does ‘[too] much 
of the heavy lifting, you then undermine the legitimacy of that government because it’s not 
seen to exercise authority.’44  
Other staff members pointed to dilemmas surrounding the protection of civilians and 
promotion of human rights in peacekeeping. One official noted, for example, that the UN is 
expected to uphold the highest standards of human rights when it intervenes, but, when faced 
with the reality of securing peace among conflict parties, queried, ‘how do you, in this context, 
compromise on values that are in the UN Charter…?’45 Another described how peacekeeping 
staff are expected to avoid dealmaking ‘with those with bad human rights records, but [also] 
 
41 von Billerbeck, ‘Mirror, Mirror’. 
42 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, January 2017. 
43 Sarah von Billerbeck, Whose Peace? Local Ownership and United Nations Peacekeeping 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
44 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, January 2017. 
45 Interview with UN official, Geneva, January 2017. 
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have to negotiate to get humanitarian results,’ adding that this is particularly difficult where 
the party committing abuses is the host country government, which missions are usually 
mandated to support.46 Another noted that there is ‘quite a lot of tension over…the UN’s 
normative commitment to human rights that precedes or even overrides all Security Council 
mandates…and in fact you have a Security Council resolution for protection of civilians that 
says, “This is an overarching and overriding responsibility,” and yet you have then the realities 
on the ground.’47 She stressed that peacekeeping staff perceive of such situations as a 
‘challenge to our normative frameworks.’ In other words, staff members’ own perceptions of 
their own legitimacy were thrown into question when faced with such dilemmas between the 
normative and the operational—dilemmas that one former official called ‘unsquareable 
circles.’48  
 Second, DPKO staff expressed concerns over their internal legitimacy when they felt 
that the peacekeeping agenda was entirely set by member states, without their input. As 
international civil servants, peacekeeping staff view themselves as independent, impartial 
experts in the design and practice of peacekeeping, and they dislike when member states fail 
to take their perspectives into account and instead make policy only on the basis of narrow 
national interests. One DPKO official explained that ‘[w]e’re the UN, we’re not from a member 
state, and we need to maintain a distance from the national.’49 Several others echoed this, 
specifying that they view it as their explicit duty—and indeed moral responsibility—to respond 
to, push back against, and challenge member states, deploying their expertise to try to influence 
policy towards more impartial, multilateral, and non-interested-based outcomes. Several 
officials expressed strong resentment at being ‘micromanaged by member states,’50 and one 
 
46 Interview with senior DPKO official, Geneva, February 2017. 
47 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
48 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, February 2017. 
49 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017 
50 Interview with senior UN official, Geneva, January 2017. 
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official declared that ‘[w]e have a duty to stand up to the P5,’ describing how doing so 
correlated directly with her sense of the legitimacy of her role.51 Another concurred, noting that 
the ability of staff to use their expertise and experience in shaping policy is ‘all about 
legitimacy.’52 In this way, staff portray what they view as their duty to engage in principled 
opposition to member states in moral terms and, as such, part of their normative identity as 
international civil servants.  
Of course, staff acknowledged the fact that, as members of the UN Secretariat, their 
role officially is to implement the decisions of the Security Council. They equally recognized 
that member states often seek the advice of Secretariat personnel on questions of peacekeeping, 
mission design, implementation, and drawdown, and that the relationship is not purely 
adversarial.53 Yet in situations where major powers, particularly the P5, had specific interests, 
they felt that any expertise and analysis they provided was sidelined and national interests took 
over. This in turn meant that a key element of their institutional identity was threatened, thus 
resulting in a need to self-legitimize.  
 Third, DPKO staff expressed particular legitimacy concerns and hence a need to self-
legitimize when they felt that operations were not going well, including minimal demonstrable 
results, a reversion to fighting in the host country, or allegations of sexual exploitation and 
abuse (SEA) or other criminal acts by UN personnel. One official noted that his sense of the 
legitimacy of his role depended on ‘seeing results and being part of something that’s bigger 
than you are,’54 and a senior manager noted that staff under his supervision are most motivated, 
convinced of their utility and correctness, and satisfied professionally when they ‘see the 
impact of their work.’55 When this is not the case, staff question their legitimacy. One argued 
 
51 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
52 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017, emphasis in original. 
53 Interview with senior DPKO officials, Geneva and New York, February 2017. 
54 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
55 Interview with senior UN official, Geneva, January 2017. 
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that, ‘[y]ou come as the international community, with flags, logos, vehicles, and you think 
you’re going to make a difference…But then you encounter challenging circumstances…In 
these circumstances, how can you keep that sense of purpose?’56 Another argued that the 
enormity of the ultimate goals of peacekeeping means that it is rare that staff feel things are 
going particularly well or that their work is having much impact, and ‘so the sense has been 
[that] legitimacy is going to have to be derived from different things because [host] state 
transformation is impossible.’57 Finally, several stated that where there were instances of SEA 
perpetrated by UN troops or other scandals involving misconduct by staff, their sense of 
legitimacy suffered particularly badly. One described that when abuses took place ‘under the 
blue flag…our own legitimacy [was] at risk’—not just in the eyes of the broader international 
community, but internally as well.58 In other words, where events occur that contradict self-
perceptions of their identity or that entail behavior inappropriate to that identity, DPKO staff 
must find alternate sources of legitimacy, and thus they turn to self-legitimation.  
 Importantly, where staff stood on the answers to the difficult choices they face in 
peacekeeping did not affect their need to self-legitimize. Indeed, disagreement among staff 
may actually heighten the need to self-legitimize because the awareness of strong divisions 
within DPKO again threatens cohesion and appropriateness. As a result, even if staff took 
different views of the right course of action in a given situation or disagreed about which of 
two conflicting obligations should be prioritized, their need to self-legitimize was the same and 
the content of their discourse, as I discuss in the next section, was remarkably uniform.   
 
Self-Legitimizing Discourse: Four Themes 
 
56 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
57 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
58 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, January 2017. 
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In order to cope with dilemmas and conflicting obligations, the inability to influence 
policy, and weak results, failures, and scandals, staff engage in self-legitimation. As discussed 
above, they use discourse that simplifies the trade-offs and dilemmas that DPKO staff face and 
that asserts that they are exceptional and superior in the international system. This 
simplification and exceptionalization in turn enable them to construct and continuously 
reaffirm a coherent institutional identity and thus retain a sense of their own appropriateness 
and legitimacy. This discourse focuses on four themes: the normative content of peacekeeping 
and the overarching values of the UN; the multilateral nature of peacekeeping; the specialized 
nature of peacekeeping work and the unique skills and expertise of DPKO staff; and 
redefinitions of success that focus on vague normative criteria, rather than on the delivery of 
concrete outputs.  
First, staff use discourse that emphasizes the normative content of peacekeeping 
objectives and the correctness of the UN as an organization at the broadest level. This discourse 
disregards the operational and ethical difficulties encountered in the practice of peacekeeping, 
and focuses instead on the moral incontestability of the pursuit of peace and the universality of 
the UN’s overarching values. For example, one former staff member described the work of 
peacekeeping as ‘self-evidently right,’ adding that, ‘for that reason you didn’t need to justify 
it, you didn’t even need to be particularly good at it, you didn’t need to have any new ideas, 
you didn’t need to subject yourself to any scrutiny.’59 This does not mean that staff do not 
acknowledge or worry about the trade-offs they face—on the contrary, they were keenly aware 
of these dilemmas.60 But their awareness and acceptance of them often blurred into disregard 
and avoidance. Staff frequently told themselves that because they represented something 
bigger, something morally correct, and something unquestionably good—working for 
 
59 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, February 2017. 
60 Interviews with DPKO officials, New York, February 2017. 
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international peace and security, the protection of civilians, the promotion of human rights, and 
the facilitation of political representation and citizen participation61—they were able to 
‘assum[e] that [their work] was legitimate, and that the ends…justified the means.’62 Several 
others reiterated this, calling peacekeeping ‘self-evidently legitimate work.’63 In other words, 
staff use discourse that simplifies the goals of peacekeeping, thus ignoring the complexities 
and difficult choices they are sometimes forced to make when actually implementing those 
goals. In addition, these broad goals are considered morally unassailable and beyond reproach, 
and therefore the fact that DPKO staff work for them makes them exceptional and set apart 
from other actors in the international system.  
Beyond the normative content of peacekeeping itself, DPKO staff also appealed to the 
overarching values of the Charter. One official declared that the injunction ‘to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war’ was the Charter’s ‘most precious sentence.’64 And while 
he admitted that in the daily work of peacekeeping, as a matter of practicality, one must 
translate such aspirational goals into more bite-sized, implementable ones, he did maintain that 
‘[t]he reason that you get up in the morning is because you tell yourself you’re going to deliver 
peace, security, and participatory development.’65 Another agreed, declaring that the Charter 
is ‘the most beautiful prose ever written in the English language’ and ‘it’s very difficult to read 
that and not be moved.’66 Others also concurred, with one noting that ‘[the Charter] creates the 
overall legitimacy [of] why you have a peacekeeping mission…I really do believe that.’67 In 
this way, appealing to the values of the Charter enables staff to both simplify what they do into 
 
61 United Nations, ‘What is peacekeeping’, available at: 
{https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping }, accessed 25 February 2020. 
62 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, February 2017. 
63 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, February 2017. 
64 Interview with UN official, New York, February 2017. 
65 Interview with UN official, New York, February 2017. 
66 Interview with UN official, Geneva, February 2017. 
67 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, January 2017. 
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clear and unassailable objectives and reaffirm that what they are doing is right and correct, 
regardless of any trade-offs and dilemmas they face in practice. 
Moreover, staff further buttress their own legitimacy by telling themselves that these 
goals and values are universally shared. In peace operations, it is not uncommon for UN staff 
to find themselves operating among beneficiaries and stakeholders who may not agree with 
their mandated tasks and goals. Yet as one staff member described, ‘I believe [in] a set of 
beliefs we all share that is core, irrespective of culture…[which makes] me feel less conflicted 
about some of the actions we [are] doing.’68 Another asserted that ‘[w]e all in a way are good 
intrinsically, without questioning the applicability, feasibility, and even desirability of our 
work in some of the societies we’re working in.’69 Another noted that because staff were, as he 
described it, ‘self-referentially legitimate,’ they could avoid scrutinizing their behavior when 
it was contradictory or ethically questionable, for example, when they ‘us[ed] colossally 
undemocratic means to prepare a democratic society.’70 Another noted that while peacekeeping 
has evolved over time, ‘there are certain things and certain rules that are immutable’71—that 
is, values and processes that DPKO staff consider universally acknowledged as the ‘right’ way 
to do things and therefore not up for discussion or negotiation. In this way, UN staff appeal to 
what they consider undisputed and undisputable moral standards in an attempt to ‘convince 
[them]selves’ that they are behaving appropriately.72 Put differently, their discourse focuses on 
what the UN represents in the broadest sense—its lofty goals of creating and maintaining 
international peace and security and of creating a world characterized by equality and 
tolerance—what one former staff member called ‘the idea of the UN.’73 Another echoed this, 
 
68 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
69 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017, emphasis in original. 
70 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, February 2017. 
71 Interview with DPKO official, New York, November 2017. 
72 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
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describing a sense of legitimacy and purpose from ‘the idea of our identity: this is who we are, 
this is what we represent.’74 Here again, DPKO staff use discourse to reaffirm their 
exceptionalism and thus their legitimacy. 
Second, staff members described legitimacy based upon their belonging to a 
multilateral international organization with universal membership. Multilateralism is often 
associated with enhanced legitimacy, because no particular state can push its individual 
interests, and consensus enables decisions with input from all stakeholders, thus rendering them 
more representative and therefore legitimate.75 DPKO staff have strongly internalized the idea 
that multilateralism represents the most appropriate method of decision-making on matters of 
peace and security at the international level. This is of course partly due to the fact that they 
are a self-selected group of people who opt to work for the UN because they subscribe to the 
advantages of multilateralism. But they also appear to consider that the overall rightness and 
appropriateness of their activities derives at least partly from the fact that they are undertaken 
in the name of the international community and not any particular state. Accordingly, in 
situations where they face operational and normative dilemmas or where they feel pushed to 
take actions that do promote only the narrow interests of one or a few member states, they 
return discursively to their multilateralism, stressing the fact that they are international and 
impartial and that this is a source of legitimacy for them.  
As one DPKO staff member noted, ‘the legitimacy of peacekeeping traditionally and 
its doctrines and concepts…stems from being the voice of the global community, the 
perception that it brings with it a certain impartial external voice of a global community.’76 
Another asserted that, ‘there is a culture particularly among…the international UN staff who 
 
74 Interview with former senior DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
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make this a career that they are not reflecting a perspective of a particular country.’77 Indeed, 
the practice of peacekeeping, because it entails intervention, imposition, and involvement in a 
variety of domestic processes normally off-limits to outsiders, runs counter to norms relating 
to sovereignty, self-determination, and non-interference that are enshrined in the organization’s 
Charter, and staff feel much more comfortable undertaking interventions that, officially at least, 
have the backing of the entire international community of states because they are seen to 
minimize the violation of those norms.78 As a result, they utilize discourse that underscores the 
multilateral nature of their work, as a way of convincing themselves of their own legitimacy, 
even where they are, in fact, forced to violate those norms. One noted that peacekeeping 
operations authorized by the UN, in contrast to bilateral arrangements or ad hoc coalitions, 
‘give you a level of legitimacy that nobody else can claim and it’s very interesting how often 
we come back to that as a source of strength, not weakness.’79 In this way, not only do DPKO 
staff derive legitimacy for peacekeeping activities through the UN’s universal character, but 
they also maintain a very strong sense of identity as international civil servants and expressed 
a belief that being representatives of the international community is exceptional and inherently 
legitimate.80 
A third source of self-legitimacy is the specialized nature of the work that DPKO does. 
As mentioned, DPKO staff regard themselves as experts with specialist training and experience 
who are ‘highly motivated and skilled in pursuing their work in an effective manner.’81 
Accordingly, they use discourse that reiterates this self-perception of being unique ‘experts in 
their fields.’82 One described UN peacekeeping as ‘the body of 70 years’ worth of experience 
 
77 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
78 Interview with DPKO official, New York, February 2017. 
79 Interview with former senior DPKO official, Geneva, January 2017, emphasis added. 
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and 70 odd missions…that we’ve directed.’83 And while that expertise is sometimes blocked 
by member states, DPKO staff derive an enormous amount of self-legitimacy where it is not. 
As one official put it, ‘the UN’s ability to influence [the policy making process] is all about 
legitimacy.’84 Several others described peacekeeping as a vocation, remarking that ‘being an 
international civil servant…gives you a sense of purpose, it’s quite inspiring.’85 Discursively 
reiterating their specialized skills and unique professional profiles thus exceptionalizes DPKO 
staff by enabling them to view themselves as special, superior, and thus particularly legitimate, 
regardless of any conflicting obligations they face.86  
Fourth, in a bid to counter the loss of internal legitimacy associated with perceived 
failure or weak performance, staff simplify or redefine the criteria for success to entail not 
concrete outputs but instead advocacy, participation, and resolve. One stressed that for 
peacekeeping staff, success means being ‘witness to [and] advocates for’ peace, security, and 
human rights.87 Legitimacy thus derives not from the concrete outcomes, but from ‘advocacy 
on behalf of normative standards…the advocacy of just staying there and being seen to 
accompany a people even in their worst days.’88 Basing legitimacy on representing and 
advocating for certain normative standards, of course, puts UN staff above reproach, even 
where peacekeeping is not delivering tangible outcomes, because the normative standards of 
the UN are perceived by staff to be unassailable. As one remarked, ‘we have to come up with 
a narrative…[in which] you need to be positive’ and tell ‘successful stories.’89 Another asserted 
 
83 Interview with DPKO official, New York, November 2017. 
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that success entails ‘preventing the absolute worst happening,’90 and another declared, ‘I know 
we are better off with peacekeeping than not. A bad peace agreement is often better than none 
at all. It may not be perfect, but it’s better than nothing.’91  
Here, the bar for success is set extremely low and success is linked to only the vaguest 
and most minimal of criteria, focusing much more on good intentions and inputs than concrete 
outputs. As one senior staff member put it, the difficult choices and imperfect decisions the UN 
is compelled to take matter less ‘if your heart is in the right place—if you’re really trying to 
help nations affected by conflict.’92 However, by defining success in terms of advocacy, 
accompaniment, and intentions, staff can almost always claim success and they can therefore 
retain a sense of the appropriateness of their work even where they are faced with weak results 
or contradictory obligations. In this way, as with references to the moral correctness of the 
pursuit of peace, the universality of the UN’s values, its multilateralism, and their own unique 
expertise, discourse that highlights success and—more importantly—simplifies success criteria 
into ones that can always be achieved helps DPKO staff to maintain a sense of their own 
legitimacy even in the face of contradictory normative, operational, and institutional 
imperatives.  
 
The Paradox of Discourse: Enabling Peacekeeping and Reducing Efficiency 
While such internal discourse could be construed as inaccurate, oversimplified, and 
unproductive, I argue that the narratives that DPKO staff tell themselves actually serve as an 
enabler for action, first by reducing risk aversion and second, by generating strong professional 
loyalty in staff, something that was strongly supported by my empirical data. At the same time, 
discursive practices are time consuming and thus costly and though they may enable action, 
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they may also render it less efficient, an effect that was also borne out in interviews. I examine 
these two effects in turn, demonstrating ultimately how self-legitimation has paradoxical or 
ambiguous effects.  
Self-legitimizing discourse in DPKO, even if simplifying and self-congratulatory, 
enables staff to continue working in the complex circumstances described above in which they 
face contradictory obligations, must balance their own assessments and injunctions from 
member states, and are beset by weak results and scandals. Indeed, the social construction of 
reality that occurs through discourse ‘make[s] action possible’ by specifying identities, 
appropriate action, and interests.93 Discourse can ‘authorize, enable, and justify specific 
practices and policies’ by demonstrating that they are appropriate to a particular identity.94 This 
enabling occurs in two ways: by reducing risk aversion and by instilling deep professional 
loyalty in staff. 
 First, the self-referential discourse that DPKO staff use on a repeated basis reduces their 
aversion to risk. By reassuring them that they are acting in line with what is appropriate to their 
institutional identity, they are more willing to take on the difficult work of peacekeeping in 
risky and insecure contexts and to confront the difficult dilemmas that peacekeeping involves. 
Indeed, as described above, DPKO staff pride themselves on going to the hardest conflicts 
where the chances of peacekeeping success are remote in order to ‘stand by’ countries and 
populations affected by war. As one DPKO official put it, ‘life is pretty miserable in these 
places, so I do think there is an element of identity and legitimacy that explains why people 
keep working…with very little results to show for on a daily basis and constantly having to 
start again.’95 If staff convince themselves that their work is successful even where outputs are 
weak or where mission staff are involved in gross misconduct, they are more willing to stick 
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with it. Equally, where they are persuaded that they are doing good, then they are more likely 
to persist where they face choices relating, for example, to human rights or support to 
unpalatable armed actors. In this way, the discourse that DPKO staff use internally, even if 
oversimplified and inaccurate, enables them, at least in part, to persist in the face of normative-
operational trade-offs, the sometimes fraught relationship with member states, and poor or 
nonexistent results and scandals. In other words, self-legitimizing discourse reaffirms to staff 
their identity as the people who go to difficult places, a specialized elite who persevere in the 
face of challenges because their work is inherently moral and legitimate. 
Second, DPKO’s self-legitimizing discourse instills a deep loyalty to the UN in staff. 
As mentioned, DPKO staff regard themselves as experts with specialist training and experience 
and their work as necessarily correct and morally unassailable. This allows them to perceive of 
themselves an elite that is unique in the international system, and this self-perception generates 
deep pride in DPKO staff.96 Indeed, most spoke of the UN in deeply loyal, even religious terms. 
Several called themselves ‘believers’ in the UN97 and one specified that he ‘ha[s] faith, despite 
daily testing of that faith.’98 Another characterized the disposition among staff as ‘a cult of 
devotion,’99 and one official declared adamantly, ‘this is a religious organization for God’s 
sake…and we should be venerating Saint Dag [Hammarskjöld] the Martyr and Saint Ralph 
[Bunche] and Saint Margaret [Anstee].’100 This deep pride and loyalty to the organization 
persists even in the face of the dilemmas and trade-offs entailed by the UN’s multidimensional 
identity and it is made possible by the self-legitimizing discourse that DPKO staff tell 
themselves. In this way, the discursive insistence on their own exceptionalism and on belonging 
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to a morally irreproachable organization prevents DPKO staff from simply abandoning their 
work when faced with complexity and contradiction. 
At the same time, while ‘talk’ in DPKO may enable action, it may also render that 
action less efficient. There are two reasons for this: the costliness of discursive self-legitimation 
practices and the resistance to self-evaluation that they give rise to. First, crafting and telling 
narratives of cohesion and appropriateness is time-consuming and thus costly. As von 
Billerbeck points out, staff tend to tell and re-tell these self-referential narratives in a form of 
‘ongoing self-legitimation,’101 and Geiger and Antonacopoulou stress that success stories in 
organizations are ‘told over and over.’102 Indeed, staff noted that they spend a significant 
amount of time and resources on the repetition of self-legitimizing discourse; this, however, 
inevitably leaves less time for the action that this discourse enables.  
Second, self-legitimizing discourse may discourage DPKO staff from accurately 
assessing their own performance, thus allowing inefficient or ineffective practices to persist. 
As discussed, self-legitimizing discourse needs to simplify away challenges, complexity, and 
dilemmas, underscore the moral superiority of peacekeepers, and portray actions as aligned 
with overarching norms and principles, much more than it needs to be accurate. However, this 
in turn eliminates the need for self-reflection or self-scrutiny and may encourage overly 
positive self-assessments by DPKO staff. As Meyer and Rowan point out, ‘inspection and 
evaluation can uncover events and deviations that undermine legitimacy’ and self-legitimation 
thus tends to ignore or downplay the need for such accurate self-assessment or scrutiny.103 
Indeed, staff pointed to the slow pace of reform within the UN as symptomatic of this 
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phenomenon.104 Furthermore, even if staff do undertake self-evaluation, they often measure 
their performance against criteria of appropriateness and not criteria of efficiency or 
effectiveness.105 This is hardly surprising: if one is convinced that one’s work is inherently 
correct, one’s objectives are necessarily good, and one’s position is exceptional and unique, 
then there is no need to engage in detailed self-reflection and self-criticism, let alone 
fundamentally amend one’s goals and strategies.  
 
Conclusion 
 Actors in the international system engage not only in exogenous legitimation aimed at 
convincing those subject to their authority of their legitimacy, but also endogenous legitimation 
aimed at convincing themselves of their own legitimacy. To do so, they use discourse to define, 
validate, and reaffirm their own perceptions of their own identity and demonstrate that their 
behavior aligns with that identity. This can be considered an ongoing, defining, and constitutive 
activity undertaken by political actors.  
 In the case of UN peacekeeping, however, self-legitimation is complicated by the fact 
that the organization has a multifaceted identity that often dictates conflicting duties and 
imperatives. This, in turn, makes attempts to reaffirm a cohesive identity more difficult, but 
also perhaps more important, as DPKO staff are uncomfortable with ‘violating’ different sides 
of their identity. UN peacekeeping staff therefore rely on discourse that reconciles or disregards 
clashes between their normative, operational, and institutional obligations and that reassures 
them that they are acting in accordance with all parts of their identity.106 This is accomplished 
discursively through simplification—which diminishes the trade-offs and contradictions 
 
104 Interview with UN official, New York, January 2017. 
105 Meyer and Rowan, ‘Institutionalized Organizations,’ p. 360. 
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inherent in DPKO—and exceptionalization—which creates a special, exclusive, and moral 
identity for DPKO staff. 
 These processes of simplification and exceptionalization in turn enable staff in DPKO 
to continue the work of peacekeeping despite its complexity, and in this sense their internal 
‘talk’ should be valued and supported. At the same time, talk takes time. It can thus eat up 
resources and render the actions it enables less efficient. In addition, the narratives that DPKO 
staff use for self-legitimation may discourage accurate self-assessment, thus permitting 
inefficient and ineffective practices to persist. In this regard, self-legitimation is paradoxical 
and ultimately, its effects may be ambiguous: there may be no action without talk, but there is 
also less action with talk.  
This ambiguity suggests that self-legitimizing discourse has two broader repercussions. 
First, it may be that the use of simplifying and exceptionalizing discourse in DPKO engenders 
a more general resistance to reform by limiting what is viewed as possible by staff. As Allan 
notes, discourse ‘delimit[s] the imaginable, knowable, sayable, and doable,’ and can ‘render 
some actions…as unthinkable or illegitimate.’107 Autesserre, similarly, points out that 
narratives that are repeated over time can come to be seen as ‘the only conceivable ones.’108 
Self-legitimizing discourse may therefore not only limit the scope for meaningful self-
assessment, but more broadly predispose DPKO staff against larger reforms that fundamentally 
challenge how peacekeeping works, which, as noted, was evident in the empirical data 
presented here. The slow pace of strategic change within DPKO and the tendency to tweak 
how peacekeeping is done only at the margins despite numerous reform attempts undertaken 
over three decades since the end of the Cold War is well-known.109 While there are diverse 
 
107 Allan, Scientific Cosmology, p. 41, 42. See also Marc Angenot, ‘Social Discourse 
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reasons for these frequent failures—including, as mentioned, hierarchy and self-interest, as 
well as involvement by member states and others— it is likely that discursive self-legitimation 
exacerbates the general resistance to reform in DPKO.  
Second, self-legitimation may reduce external perceptions of DPKO’s legitimacy. 
Although UN staff tell themselves narratives about a cohesive and positive institutional 
identity, they do not actually resolve the contradictions they face. Indeed, while UN staff may 
invoke their dedication to the pursuit of peace and to multilateralism and may attempt to 
convince themselves that the values and objectives they pursue are universally shared and 
normatively correct, the fact is that they may still violate these norms and principles in the 
practice of peacekeeping. On the ground, real decisions need to be taken about how to sequence 
or prioritize actions, decisions that are, as described, often taken in a hierarchical fashion or 
based upon self-interest and internal competition within DPKO. While staff may use discourse 
in an attempt to diminish or justify these choices, discourse does not eliminate them. As a 
result, DPKO staff may say one thing but do another, and their words are not necessarily backed 
up by actions. In this way, whether or not UN staff believe their own discourse, DPKO’s 
external legitimacy audiences are likely to perceive a gap between the rhetoric and the reality 
of peacekeeping, and thus may perceive DPKO as contradictory, insincere, or unreliable. 
Indeed, as much as DPKO may consider its discourse as indicative of social reality, such 
accounts will be contested by counter-discourses from other groups and actors, whose 
conception of the possible, the appropriate, and the legitimate differ. As a result, it is likely that 
the UN’s internal discourse may cause external perceptions of DPKO legitimacy to suffer, even 
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though it may successfully boost internal ones, an effect that is likely to be exacerbated by the 
reduced efficiency and effectiveness that self-legitimation engenders. 
It is probable that these two issues extend to both other parts of the UN system as well 
as other international organizations. As described, organizations that have multifaceted 
identities and that, as a consequence, face contradictory normative, operational, and 
institutional obligations will use a variety of mechanisms to resolve these tensions. Alongside 
hierarchy or self-interest, they will also engage in self-legitimation and the creation and telling 
of a unified story of organizational appropriateness. We can therefore expect a range of UN 
entities, such as UNDP or UNICEF, and international organizations, such as the World Bank110 
or NATO,111 to use discourse to simplify the dilemmas they face and portray themselves as 
exceptional, relevant, and legitimate. All of these organizations play both normative and 
operational roles and have dual institutional structures consisting of member states and a 
secretariat of international staff. They thus face many of the same dilemmas that DPKO staff 
do, in which their multiple identities dictate multiple and at time conflicting appropriate 
behaviors. By contrast organizations with singular, cohesive identities, such as the World Trade 
Organization, can be expected to engage in far less discursive self-legitimation as there will be 
fewer conflicts and tensions surrounding what is considered acceptable and appropriate. 
In this regard, an awareness of why and when international organizations need to self-
legitimize and how they do so can help us to better understand the behavior of these 
organizations and how they can be most effective. As noted, self-legitimation has been largely 
omitted from the study of legitimacy in international organizations, and examination of the 
discourse used by organizations has focused on that which is directed outwards, as part of their 
general public relations and advertising efforts, with internal discourse written off as 
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bureaucratic inefficiency and a waste of time. As this article has shown however, internal ‘talk,’ 
despite its deleterious effects on efficiency, effectiveness, and reform, serves an enabling 
function and should be considered not just a fact of organizational life, but a critical part of 
organizational action. 
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